時間：2018年3月30日（周五）15:00-16:30
地點：科研樓517A
報告題目：Information Sharing Between Competitors with Endogenous Timing in Production
報告人簡介：Tian Li is currently an associate professor in the School of Business of East China University of Science and Technology. She obtained her PhD in Operations Management from The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Her research interests include operations-marketing interface, supply chain competition, and information sharing and contract design in supply chains. Her work has been published in journals such as Production and Operations Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Omega, and Decision Sciences.
Abstract
We study the incentives for information sharing between two competing firms with different production timing strategies. Each firm is planning to produce a new (upgraded) product. One firm adopts routine timing, whereby her production time is fixed in her tradition of manufacturing previous product models. The other firm uses strategic timing, whereby his production time can be strategically chosen: be it before, simultaneously with, or after the routine firm. The two firms simultaneously choose whether or not to disclose their private demand information, make their quantity decisions based on any demand information available, and then compete in the market. We find that when the demand uncertainty is not high, both firms sharing information is the unique equilibrium outcome. Exactly one firm (the routine firm) sharing information can arise in equilibrium when the demand uncertainty is intermediate. These results are in stark contrast to extant literature which has shown that, for Cournot competitors with substitutable goods, no firm is willing to share demand information. Production timing is thus identified as a key driving force for horizontal information sharing, which might have been overlooked before. Surprisingly, when the competition becomes more intense, firms are more willing to share information. It is the information asymmetry that fundamentally change the strategic firm’s timing. We highlight the impact of signaling demand information for an early-production firm on the timing strategies, under different information sharing arrangements.
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